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The Mythological Machine in the Great
Civil War (2001–2021): Oikos and Polis in
Nation-Making
BILLIE JEANNE BROWNLEE AND MAZIYAR GHIABI
Exeter University, Exeter, UK
ABSTRACT: The article revisits ‘sectarianism’ as an epistemic venue within the context of a Great
Civil War in the Middle East (2001-2021), a label that includes the overarching narratives of
political life in the aftermath of 9/11 up to the aftermath of the so-called ‘Arab Spring.’ By
introducing the notion of the ‘mythological machine,’ it argues that ‘sectarianism’ is a myth,
something that does not exist in real terms, but which has real world effects. The mythological
machine is a device that produces epiphanies and myths; it is a gnoseological process, which
has cultural, social and political effects through the generation of mythological facts and, as a
machine, it does so through both guiding and automatized mechanisms. Through this
interpretive shift, the article proceeds through several theoretical steps using a variety of cases
from across West Asia and North Africa, contextualizing them within global political events.
Firstly, the article argues that it is ‘civil war,’ shaped by the work of the mythological machine
that governs state-society relations and transnational politics in the Middle East. Then, the
article discusses how the mythological machine incorporates a semantic othering via
mythological thinking, speak and practice that shapes the perception and experience of civil
wars. To conclude, the article discusses how the mythological machine displaces people’s status
in the context of civil wars leading to the emergence of new forms of belonging and nation-
making. Ultimately, the mythological machine creates what Giorgio Agamben defines as a state
without people, a condition exhausting the value of citizenship and the political.
KEY WORDS: Arab Spring; Civil war; Counter-revolution; Displacement; Myths; Mythological
machine; Revolution; Sectarianism; Social theory; State-society relations
We have to conceive of politics as a field of forces the extremes of which are
oikos [house] and polis [city]: between them it is civil war that marks the
threshold through which the apolitical is politicized and the political is
economized.1
Giorgio Agamben, Stasis
Correspondence address: Billie Jeanne Brownlee, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, Exeter University,
Exeter, UK. E-mail: B.J.Brownlee@exeter.ac.uk; Maziyar Ghiabi, College of Social Sciences International
Affairs, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK; E-mail: aziyar.ghiabi@exeter.ac.uk
1 Note: All translations are the authors’ work unless stated otherwise.Giorgio Agamben (2015) Stasis: La
guerra civile come paradigma politico [The civil war as political paradigm] (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri),
p. 30.
 2021 Editors of Middle East Critique
Middle East Critique, 2021
https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2021.1911460
‘The mythological machine… produces mythologies and induces to believe [in
them], pressing, that it conceals the myth within its impenetrable walls.’2
Furio Jesi, Lettura del Bateau Ivre di Rimbaud
The outbreak of the Arab uprisings in 2011 triggered tectonic changes in the
region. On the one hand, there has been a remarkable transformation in the
region’s political life, with people gaining new leverage in contesting state power;
on the other hand, autocratic regimes have proved to have great resilience, either
by launching a process of re-styling through reforms or embarking in fierce battles
to maintain power. Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo and Khartoum are still hotspots
of political confrontation and foundational struggle for state-society configurations
as much as for transnational politics. This rehearsal of the ‘Arab Spring’ confirms
that the events unfolding since 2011 remain a bitterly contested and misunderstood
phenomenon.3 They are still in fieri, in progress rather than in posse,
just potential.
If many academics had viewed the Arab uprisings as the fourth wave of democracy
finally reaching the Arab world,4 the chaos and violence that followed did not just
shatter the dream of democratic transition, but also it solidified the process of
‘othering’ the region as inherently different and backward, still ravaged by sectarian
violence and disputes. The outbreak of new conflicts, often degenerating into civil
wars; and of old ones (yet to be resolved), is leading scholars and commentators to
resuscitate the category of ‘sectarianism’ to explain violence in the Middle East.5 The
term ‘sectarianism’ often is used to describe sentiments that justify violent and illiberal
manifestations of age-old antagonistic religious identities’ (currently in the Middle
East, it is Sunni vs. Shi’a), inter-communal warfare and genocidal violence perpetuated
by one group against another. Sectarianism is blamed for the chaos, with authoritarian-
ism, conflict, displacement and extremism characterizing the region as a whole. The
sectarian card triggers the enunciation of grand theories capable of reducing tangled
mechanisms of political life and contention into a dualistic rift, counterpoising antag-
onistic religious identities animated by primordial impetus and mythological cadres in
their mutual struggle. In doing so, sectarianism as a theory understands identity as
static and one-dimensional and ignores – or puts in a secondary place – other features
such as class, kinship, local or national local identifications that feed sectar-
ian conflicts.6
This article revisits ‘sectarianism’ within the political transformations of the region
with the aim of formulating an alternative paradigm of interpretation. Introducing the
2 Furio Jesi (1996) Lettura del Bateau Ivre di Rimbaud [Reading of Rimbaud's Bateau Ivre] (Macerata:
Quodlibet, vol. 14), p. 51.
3 We wrote a critique of the ‘Arab Spring’ in a previous article, see Billie Jeanne Brownlee & Maziyar
Ghiabi (2016) Passive, Silent and Revolutionary: The ‘Arab Spring’ Revisited, Middle East Critique,
25(3), pp. 299–316.
4 P. N. Howard, & M. M. Hussain (2013) Democracy's Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the Arab
Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
5 The list of recent scholarship on ‘sectarianism’ is immense. See Google Scholar ‘Sectarianism in the
Middle East.’ Available at https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=sectarianism%
2C±middle±east&btnG¼, accessed February 22, 2021.
6 See Usama Makdisi (2017) The Mythology of the Sectarian Middle East (James A. Baker III Institute
for Public Policy of Rice University). Available at: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/mythology-
sectarian-middle-east/.
2 B. J. Brownlee and M. Ghiabi
notion of the ‘mythological machine,’ it argues that ‘sectarianism’ is a myth, some-
thing that does not exist, but that has real world effects. The mythological machine is
a device that produces epiphanies and myths; it is a gnoseological process whose cul-
tural, social and political effects are generated via mythological facts and, as a
machine, it does so through both guiding and automatized mechanisms. Through this
interpretive shift, the article proceeds through several theoretical steps using a variety
of cases from across West Asia and North Africa. Firstly, it provides a very brief over-
view of how sectarian scholarship has shaped imperial politics by relying on the
‘expertise’ of Medievalist scholars and how a new scholarship is emerging with a
counter discourse. Rather than adopting the framework of ‘sectarianism,’ the article re-
interprets ‘civil war’ in continuity with the category of ‘revolts/revolution’, using as a
case example the 2011 popular revolts known as the ‘Arab Spring.’ It argues that it is
‘civil war,’ shaped by the work of the mythological machine, which governs state-soci-
ety relations and transnational politics in the Middle East. Thirdly, the article discusses
how the mythological machine incorporates a semantic othering via mythological
thinking and practice that shape the perception and experience of civil wars. To con-
clude, the article reflects on how the mythological machine displaces people’s status
within the experience of civil war leading to the emergence of new forms of belong-
ing. Ultimately, the mythological machine creates states without people, a condition
exhausting the value of citizenship and the political.7
The Medievalist-in-Chief and His Discontents
Consider: What if the United States, when invading Italy in September 1943, had
recruited several scholars of Canon Law – the body of juridical norms agreed by the
Catholic Church to regulate the life of believers and the ecclesiastical institutions –
life and politics – to study a potential constitutional order suitable for Italian society.
Then, once victorious, the US commander-in-chief, instructed by the President,
appointed one of these scholars to the role of drafting the post-fascist Italian
Constitution to harmonize Italy’s religious Catholic society with the new demo-
cratic government.
This odd hypothetical example does not fall far from truth in the case of post-war
Iraq. In 2003, at the time of the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution, Paul Bremer, then
head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, sought the consultancy of Noah Feldman,
a Harvard University law professor, who wrote his doctoral dissertation at Oxford
University, ‘Reading the Nicomachean ethics with Ibn Rushd.’ One might wonder
‘what is this topic’s relationship to the complex configuration of Iraq’s modern consti-
tution’? This background may explain how the new constitution resulted in a sectarian
artefact immersed in a timeless reading of identity politics, dividing citizenship and
institutional authorities along sectarian religious lines. Writing in Al-Ahram Weekly,
Edward Said reminded readers that Feldman ‘has never practiced law in the Arab
world, never been to Iraq … what an open-faced snub not only to Iraq itself, but also
to the legions of Arab and Muslim legal minds … .’8.
7 Cf. Agamben, Stasis, passim.
8 Edward Said (2003) Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 22–28 May (Issue No. 639). Available at http://www.
mafhoum.com/press5/147P10.htm, accessed August 25, 2020.
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Although examples of Medievalists-in-Chief abound in the imperial history of the
Middle East, an in-depth discussion falls beyond the remit of this article. Feldman’s
case is not isolated: It represents a paradigmatic case of Orientalist scholarship influ-
encing contemporary configurations of the Middle East along sectarian lines. There is
a long tradition of this kind: Experts of medieval Islam refashioning themselves as
experts on contemporary affairs, conflicts and state-society tensions. One of Feldman’s
intellectual mentors was Bernard Lewis, another ‘expert’ of Medievalist Islamic
thought. Lewis became a prominent international commentator of contemporary
Islamic societies, and he advised US Republican administrations, including former US
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo.9 For example, in an excerpt ‘analyzing’ Iranian
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Lewis wrote:
There is a radical difference between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other
governments with nuclear weapons [apparently forgetful that Iran did not posses
nuclear weapons]. This difference is expressed in what can only be described as
the apocalyptic worldview of Iran's present rulers… The phrase ‘Allah will know
his own’ is usually used to explain such apparently callous unconcern [killing
Muslims while killing unbelievers]… [T]he threat of direct retaliation on Iran
is… already weakened by the suicide or martyrdom complex that plagues parts
of the Islamic world today… ‘This year, August 22 corresponds, in the Islamic
calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab [1427]. This, by tradition is the
night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet
Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq to the farthest Mosque in Jerusalem…
This might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of
Israel and if necessary of the world.10
Similarly, Daniel Pipes, founder of the right-wing think tank Middle East Forum,
employed his specialization in Medieval Islamic History (PhD, Harvard, 1978) to
become a commentator on contemporary politics. He taught at the Naval War College
and then acted as policy consultant for US Republican administrations. Pipes’s trajec-
tory and political influence is far-reaching despite his rebuke by the academic commu-
nity. He views Islam as inherently incompatible with the modern world and has
influence in conservative political circles.11 For instance, following 9/11, Boris
Johnson, then editor of The Daily Telegraph, contacted Pipes to get an immediate
commentary on the attacks. Beyond the academe, Thomas Friedman (also with an
Oxford MPhil), the New York Times columnist, has described the conflict in Yemen as
a ‘7th century struggle over who is the rightful heir to the Prophet – Shiites or
Sunnis.’12 However, the rhetoric about ‘sectarianism’ as innate in the Middle East and
as the cause of its ‘backwardness’ is misleading, obfuscating rather than clarifying the
9 See Michael R. Pompeo (2018) On the Passing of Bernard Lewis, May 20. Available at https://www.
state.gov/on-the-passing-of-bernard-lewis/, accessed August 25, 2020.
10 In Adib-Moghaddam, A. (2017) Psycho-Nationalism: Global Thought, Iranian Imaginations (London:
Cambridge University Press), p. 13.
11 Bridge ‘Factsheet (2018): Daniel Pipes’, August 14. Available at https://bridge.georgetown.edu/
research/factsheet-daniel-pipes/, accessed August 25, 2020.
12 Thomas Friedman (2015) Tell Me How This Will End Well, New York Times, April 1. Available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/opinion/thomas-friedman-tell-me-how-this-ends-well.html, accessed
August 3, 2020.
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complexity of the political turmoil in the region.13 Hard to dismiss, this framework is
often reworked in more sophisticated, but enduring tones.
There is, however, a new scholarship on ‘sectarianism,’ one that adopts diverging
persuasions, none of which is simplistic or essentializing as it has been for the
Medievalists-in-Chief. In contrast, scholars of this new school on sectarianism have
systematic knowledge of the contemporary Middle East, direct experience in the field,
and do not draw arches from the Early and Medieval Islamic period to the present.
Simon Mabon is one influential voice who categorizes those working on sectarianism
along a classical scheme which in the past was used for scholarship on nationalism, a
coincidence that in itself is telling as we will see below: The primordialist who main-
tains that religious and ethnic divisions affect political struggles (Geneive Abdo, Naser
Ghobadzadeh, and Mark Tomass); and the instrumentalists who believe these divisions
are subject to change and shifts, driven by material interests (Sami Zuabida, Gregory
Gause III, Max Weiss).14 Most scholars agree with the sectarianisation thesis advanced
by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, who, rather than saying that the region is sectar-
ian, argue that there is a regional process of sectarianisation.15 The virtue of this argu-
ment is to highlight that political Islam often takes the shape of religious nationalism
because adherents of this ideology work within the boundaries of the nation-state and
are concerned with state building at home, rather than the projection of trans-
national politics.
This emerging scholarship reassesses sectarianism by taking into account its inter-
national and sociological drivers in its most significant cases. Toby Dodge details the
origins of Iraq’s post-war settlement, tracing it back to ‘the ideational understanding of
Iraq shared by… the Bush administration.’16 Using the ‘diabolical enemy image’
schema, the United States encouraged the exclusion of social groups formerly per-
ceived as dominant (i.e., Sunni Iraqis), which turns the enemy into ‘inflexible’ and
anchored in xenophobic tropes, not dissimilar from the governing mentality of Western
imperialism-cum-Orientalism.17 The mechanism engendered by what Dodge’s refers to
as ‘the Victor’s Peace’ compel the excluded ‘Others’ to mobilize along sectarian lines
in the setting of emerging civil war. Another case similar to Iraq is that of post-2011
Syria. The Syrian civil war often is described as the prototype of a sectarian conflict,
with the Alawi minority holding on to power while the Sunni majority joins the insur-
gency.18 However, Heiko Wimmen, head of the International Crisis Group’s Middle
East bureau, reports that ‘a significant portion of Syrian Sunnis still support the
13 For a critique endorsing our argument see also, Usama Makdisi (2008) Pensee 4: Moving Beyond
Orientalist Fantasy, Sectarian Polemic, and Nationalist Denial, International Journal of Middle East
Studies, 40(4), pp. 559–560; I. Blumi (2010) Chaos in Yemen: Societal Collapse and the New
Authoritarianism (London: Routledge).
14 Simon Mabon (2020) Sectarian Games: Sovereign Power, War Machines and Regional Order in the
Middle East, Middle East Law and Governance, 12(1), pp. 1–36.
15 Nader Hashemi & Danny Postel (2017) Sectarianization: Mapping the new politics of the Middle East,
The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 15(3), pp. 1–13.
16 Toby Dodge (2012) Enemy Images, Coercive Socio-Engineering and Civil War in Iraq, International
Peacekeeping 19(4), pp. 461–477.
17 Cf. Edward Said (2012) Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage).
18 D. Byman (2014) Sectarianism afflicts the new Middle East, Survival, 56(1), pp. 79–100. See also
Billie Jeanne Brownlee (2020) New Media and Revolution: Resistance and Dissent in Pre-uprising
Syria (London: McGill-Queen's Press); and idem (2015) The Revolution “From Below” and Its
Misinterpretations “From Above”: The Case of Syria’s Neglected Civil Society, Syria Studies, 7(1),
pp. 31–59.
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regime’ while the many internally displaced people previously living in Sunni majority
areas have sought the central government’s protection.19 The same accounts for the
many Alawi protestors who challenged Damascus’ repressive policies in the first
stages of the protests but then retreated out of fear for genocidal sectarian escalation
led by radical Salafis.
Within the new scholarship on ‘sectarianism,’ one contribution that stands out,
according to both Mahon and Dodge, is that of Fanar Haddad who argues that sectar-
ianism is neither all-encompassing nor non-existent; it is ‘not just a tool of political
elites seeking to secure their power and privilege; not just a matter of dogma and
belief; not just a political issue or a frame for intergroup competition at the subnational
level.’ Sectarianism is ‘shorthand for a variety of symbols, behaviours, actions, atti-
tudes and other phenomena related to sectarian identity.’ He recognises that sectarian-
ism is a function of nationalism and a contest about ‘who gets to define the terms of
coexistence.’20 Haddad suggests that we not dismiss sectarianism in toto, but to qualify
it with analytical meaning rather than grand schemes rooted in old and stereotyp-
ical narratives.
In dialogue with, rather than against, the emerging scholarship on sectarianism, this
article takes ‘sectarianism’ not as the departure point, but as an epistemic venue, which
has come to define the broader narrative of political life, in fact, beyond the so-called
Middle East. The article explores a shift in perspective. It is not sectarianism, which
has become a defining feature of the Middle East, but rather ‘civil wars.’ Sectarianism
is only the expression of civil wars. Since 2000, over one-third of all armed conflicts
that emerged around the world were in the Middle East. This number has grown to
half since 2011. The Syrian civil war, now in its tenth year, has reached two unfortu-
nate milestones: It is the deadliest armed conflict in the new century and the second
most lethal conflict since the Cold War, surpassed only by the massacres in Rwanda in
1994.21 When shifting the perspective from sectarianism to civil wars, one realizes
that it is civil wars that have radicalized communities and unleashed violence along
religious, ethnic and sectarian lines. It is civil wars that have generated the flood of
refugees across and beyond the region. It is civil wars that have nurtured terrorist
groups and attracted foreign terrorist recruits to the region. It is civil wars that enable
authoritarian regimes in survival mode to justify repression rather than reform and con-
cession as the only way to deal with the underlying political, economic and social
challenges facing them. And, finally, it is through civil wars that international powers
administer geopolitics.22
The ‘Great Civil War,’ what this article identifies as the period between 2001-2021,
has produced the collapse of state institutions, the transformation of ideologies, the
spread of civil unrest and violence and the displacement of communities across bor-
ders. What governs the mechanics of the Great Civil War is the mythological machine,
19 See Genevieve Abdo (2013) The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Sunni-
Shi’a Divide, Analysis Paper, 29. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-new-
sectarianism-the-arab-uprisings-and-the-rebirth-of-the-shia-sunni-divide/, accessed March 1, 2021.
20 Fanar Haddad (2020) Understanding ‘Sectarianism’: Sunni-Shi'a Relations in the Modern Arab World
(New York: Oxford University Press).
21 Jacob Mundy (2019) The Middle East Is Violence: On the Limits of Comparative Approaches to the
Study of Armed Conflict, Civil Wars, 21(4), pp. 539–568.
22 See, for the Libyan case, Matteo Capasso (2020) The War and the Economy: The Gradual Destruction
of Libya, Review of African Political Economy, 47, no. 166 (2020), pp. 545–567.
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which fabricates ‘sectarianism’ and constructs new forms of ‘belonging’ that displaces
the old notions of nation-state and community. However, before progressing to the
analysis of the Great Civil War, we need to define the mythological machine more
comprehensively.
What Is the Mythological Machine?
The mythological machine is a gnoseological device – because it produces knowledge –
that enables the persuasive power of myths. As an interpretative paradigm it indicates a
complex apparatus that incorporates and transfers collective experiences together with
socialized knowledge of ‘truth’ and history, while it reproduces mythologies, via tales, nar-
rations and artistic figurations autonomously from the source they derive. Different from
mere propaganda, the mythological machine has a life on its own. It is an engine which
does not simply produce or re-interpret myths in new fashion; it produces discourses,
ideologies and material effects, which legitimise power and stabilise identity, two key ele-
ments of a sectarian civil war. In it, thinking, speech and practice concur and co-produce
the work of the machine, rather than following a sequential line of idea, expressions and
actions. Thus, the mythological machine guides the conflict in the discernment of friends
from enemies, which nurtures the sectarian nature of reality.
As Furio Jesi says, ‘Whoever believes in the existence of myths as an existing autono-
mous substance is eventually brought to consider himself as the depository of the exegesis
which … distinguishes the righteous from the unjust, those who can live from those who
must die.’23 This process enables what Karol Kerenyi, the Hungarian classicist mytholo-
gist, identified as the birth of ‘technicised myths,’ the use of images, superstitions, sugges-
tions, passions, texts for an instrumental purpose dictated by political objectives, which he
argued emerged more blatantly during the rise of Nazi-fascism in early 20th century
Europe. So, mythological systems are reactionary by nature because they are built upon a
sentiment of an imagined but lost world to which they seek to return. Metaphorically, this
is not a world of yesterday or, even less so, of tomorrow. It is a world of the day before
yesterday, the bygone, and the world after tomorrow, the yet to come. The mythological
machine’s ontological objective is to defend pre-existing social structures and power rela-
tions, of which they are the ideological expression. Indeed, it is not the essence of myths
that matters, but their actual existence, their real function. Following this conceptual over-
view of what is a mythological machine, we shall move to put this machine into action
and to understand its praxis, which occurs through ideational, philological, and practical
processes (Figure 1).
The Great Civil War, 2001–2021: Myths and Disruption
The ‘Great Civil War’ is the term we employ to refer to the set of confrontations, con-
flicts, terrorist attacks, foreign interferences, attempted secessions and heightened
ethno-religious violence that emerged after the US declaration of the ‘War on Terror’
following September 11, 2001, especially the US military interventions in Afghanistan
in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Since 2011, a series of popular protests have shaken the
23 In M. Belpoliti & E. Manera (eds.) (2010) Furio Jesi (Milano: Marcos y Marcos), p. 205. For an
overview of Jesi’s work on the mythological machine, see Furio Jesi (1989) Mito (Milano: Mondadori).
The Mythological Machine in the Great Civil War (2001–2021) 7
region’s political cadre: It did not take long for popular political demands to shift
against specific ethnic or religious groups, accelerating the process of territorial disin-
tegration and societal transformation after 2001. Civil wars characterize the political
struggle in Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen but spread beyond these cases reaching
Egypt, where anti-Muslim Brotherhood fear led to levels of repression along sectarian
lines (anti-Islamists) which became more blatant than in the pre-uprising era.
Reverberations of this kind, though opposite, were also visible in Turkey, either with
the long-term conflict with the Kurds or with the polarizing confrontation between
Turkish president Recep T. Erdogan and most of the Turkish non-AKP opposition.
The conflict in Turkey as well as those in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Yemen
have been contested within the framework of political struggles, which have not led to a
‘sectarianization’ of the conflict, even though religion has not absent. They have been
struggles over how to govern the nation rather than over who belongs to the nation. The
continuum between revolt/revolution and civil war is where the agency of the mytho-
logical machine is most effective in transforming the political struggle into a praxis of
‘othering’ by intervening in the modi operandi of knowledge production. There is no epi-
stemic difference between forms of civil war in the Middle East and those in other
regions. Instead, it is the triggering of the mythological machine that displaces existing
forms of belonging in favour of new ones. Thus, observers and local fighters interpret civil
wars through localized semantics, in the absence of global frames of interpreting political
revolts. This semantics is imbued in multiple layers of meaning: in mythological thinking,
situating the contemporary world in a time before the origins; philological – using lan-
guage as interpreter of realities; and political – outlining strategies for framing conflicts
and collective futures. By introducing the analytical model of the mythological machine,
this section discusses the significance of ‘myths’ and ‘mythologies’ in the understanding
of the Great Civil War, highlighting also the epistemological, philological and practical
dimensions deriving from it.
Mythological Thinking
For those accepting it, a ‘myth’ is a true (hi)story which occurred in a time of origins




Figure 1. The mythological machine.
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– in virtue of its foundational nature – is always valid, creating forms of mythic ances-
tries to be imitated and a flow of time whence everything already had happened once.
As a device narrating human life and the life of communities, ‘myths’ produce forms
of knowledge that become ‘mythologies’ (mythosþ logos).24 Inspired by religious or
nationalist hagiographies or epics, mythologies operate also as an attempt at qualifying
the community of origins and, hence in nationalist/religious, sect-coded logics, the pre-
sent communities. Both self-declared secular nationalists and religious clerics embrace
them. This is the case among ethno-nationalist groups claiming to restore the lands of
their fathers (e.g., Aryanism, Zionism, white supremacism, Hindutva, etc.); but it
works similarly with scholars in Islamic jurisprudence and exegesis highlighting the
need to return to the times of origin (e.g., Salafism, ISIS jurists).25
For example, the science (‘ilm) of hadith builds upon the narrations of mythological
histories for the enunciation of norms and morals pertaining to the present. The
Islamic State systematically has employed early Islamic (hi)stories to justify its tactics
against local and regional enemies, especially Shi’is. In the case of Abu Asaad Al-
Samaan, an ISIS-affiliated jurist, he used the hadith of Safiyya bint Abdul-Mutalib
(570-640 AD) to legitimise the practice of beheading in the combat setting.26 Or
Khaled Ibn al-Walid, one of the commanders during the Islamic conquests, who killed
captive prisoners with no justification other than his pledge to God ‘to make a river
with his enemies’ blood.’27 Hadiths, because they are realistic tales belonging to the
era of the righteous community – the community of origin – become powerful mobil-
isation tools for undertaking violent actions.
ISIS it is not the only political group that makes use of mythologies to define who
is and who is not part of the nation. The grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdal Aziz ibn
Baz, formulated an extensive body of literature and sermons condemning the Shi’is.
His language focuses on disloyalty, esoterism, weird practices portraying the Shi’is as
malignant others who do not qualify as ‘our brothers.’28 His fatwas remain an influen-
tial source in the juridical practice of Saudi courts. These rulings bear discursive and
symbolic value, but also effective application of power. In 2014, a Saudi court sen-
tenced a Sunni man to prison because of the crime of ‘sitting with Shi’i.’29 Inspired
by this reading, the leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq, al-Zarqawi wrote of the Shi’i’s as ‘the
most evil of mankind,’ ‘the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spy-
ing enemy, … a sect of treachery and betrayal through history.’30
The casting out of the enemy as a mythological force requires a vital response from
the community. The mythological nature of the enemy, in this case the Shi’is, shapes
the understanding of contemporary conflicts, such as the Great Civil War. Sheikh
24 It is worth noting how ‘mythology’ is itself an inherently paradoxical category as it is a coexistence of
‘myths,’ i.e., ‘stories that are not true’ and ‘logos,’ i.e., stories that can be understood. See further
Belpoliti & Manera (eds.), Furio Jesi, pp. 188–190.
25 We are aware that the cases of Zionism and Hindutva represent an overlapping of the ethno-nationalist
and religious ideologies, but within the scheme of our analysis, this difference between the two is
not important.
26 Hassan Hassan (2017) The Sectarianism of, pp. 56–57.
27 Ibid.
28 See Human Rights Watch (2017) They Are not Our Brothers, September 26. Available at https://www.
hrw.org/report/2017/09/26/they-are-not-our-brothers/hate-speech-saudi-officials, accessed July 30, 2020.
29 Ibid.
30 US Department of State 2001-09 Archive, Zarqawi Letter. Available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/
nea/rls/31694.htm, accessed July 30, 2020.
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Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a leading Sunni theologian and jurist formerly based at Al-Azhar
in Cairo, declared in a fatwa that, since the Syrian Civil War was a plot by the invad-
ing Shi’is, it was the duty of ‘every Muslim trained to fight … to make himself avail-
able.’31 In the Wahhabi penal code, which is de facto the law of the land in Saudi
Arabia while being influential across the Arab monarchies overall, the concept of loy-
alty to Islam and rejection of un-Islamic ways (wala wal bara) has facilitated the tar-
geting of Shi’is both in terms of morally not belonging to the community and as a
practical endeavour against them. Together with tawhid (the oneness of God), wala
wal bara (loyalty and disavowal) has played a central role in the Islamic State’s gov-
ernance of otherness.32
The vision of a rising manipulative enemy, the Shi’is, acquired rhetorical geopolit-
ical marks when the Hashemite monarch of Jordan described the escalation of conflicts
in the Levant as a sign of ‘a Shi’i Crescent.’33 Such assertion emboldens mythological
thinking, a prototype, though opposite, of which was also manifest in what Ali Allawi,
Iraq’s interim defence minister in the Iraqi Governing Council and Iraqi Transnational
Government (2003-2006) circulated in a document proposing a grand political strategy
to fellow party members of the United Iraqi Alliance whereby Iraq was envisioned
with a dominant Shi’i ruling group along with smaller sects and ethnicities.’34
Competing ideas about what is national identity foment the questioning of localized
expressions of it.
The sectarian rift, what some call the sectarianisation of the region, is not simply
the effect caused by historical mistakes or the manipulation of autocratic and destabi-
lized regimes. As Fanar Haddad argues, the fall of Saddam Hussein was ambivalent
even for those Sunnis who had opposed his rule because the celebrations were ‘so
heavily tinged with someone else’s mythology of victimhood and entitlement,’35 that
is to say to the Shi’is recollecting elements of the myth of Hussein’s martyrdom at
Karbala (in 680 CE). These mythologies produce laws and regulations, hence models
of behaviour, but also mythological thinking on communal history and enemy com-
munities. In this way, sectarianism is the commonplace, the ‘myth’ – which cannot be
accessed or ascertained – of the Great Civil War. This mythological narrative is the
product of localised as much as globalised processes of knowledge production obtained
through the work of a mythological machine.
Mythological Speak
The mythological machine reifies the category of ‘civil war’ because it sets clear
boundaries between competing communities, which become, in turn, insoluble. The
Arabic concept of ‘civil war,’ usually translated in sociological and politico-logical
writings as harb ahliyyah, differs in its connotation from the English ‘civil war’ and
31 BBC (2003) Syria Conflict: Qaradawi Urges Sunnis to Join Rebels, June 1. Available at https://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22741588, accessed August 3, 2020.
32 Hassan, The Sectarianism, pp. 41–42.
33 NBC News (2004) King Abdullah of Jordan, September 12. Available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
6679774/ns/msnbc-hardball_with_chris_matthews/t/king-abdullah-ii-jordan/#.X0S86cgzY2x, accessed
August 24, 2020.
34 Haddad, Shia-centric State-Building, pp. 118–119.
35 Ibid, p. 130.
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the Latin bellum civile. Harb ahliyyah refers to kith and kin, to community rather than
to citizens, whereas ‘civil war’ and bellum civile highlight the civic dimension of the
conflict, i.e., a conflict over the city-power, the polis. In harb ahliyyah, communities
are the product of a gnoseological machine, which sets their origins in mythological
communities (such as the early Christian communities; the Sunni/Shi’i communities;
the ancient Judean tribes; the pre-Islamic Zoroastrian Iranians). They are not conflicts
over the content of government. In this, the Arabic term captures the genealogical ori-
gin of the Greek idea of civil war, as the war over the oikos, ‘the house’ as a subgroup
of the community. More precisely, the classical term for civil war in Persian/Dari is
khaneh jangi, a ‘house war,’ a war over the oikos.36
The outbreak of civil wars following the ‘Arab Spring’ also has led to a revival of the
Arabic term fitnah (also used in Persian as fetneh). A strongly connoted word, this is a
term used outside intellectual and academic circles, but adopted by active agents in the
civil war, particularly in reference to the archetypal Sunni-Shi’i divide throughout the
region; and more specifically vis-a-vis those perceived as pro-Iranian forces.37 Beyond its
theological implications, the concept of fitnah alludes to underlying (geo)political events
within the history of Islam, in particular that of the great sedition between Shi’i and Sunni
over government in the early Islamic Caliphate (7th century), the period very dear to the
Medievalists-in-Chief. Fitnah is a moment of crisis in which the community of believers,
the mythological community of the ummah, is split and faced with the judgment over who
should command the community, its government. Historically, Wars of Apostasy (horub
al-ridda), led by the First Caliph Abu Bakr, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad,
preceded the fitnah. This is a period of confrontation over the constituent power and those
rejecting it (rebel Arabian tribes, Kharijites, Alids, etc.).
The reference to this old historical period to characterize the nature of the contem-
porary conflict is void of political value. The contemporary use of fitnah in the Great
Civil War alludes to a framing of the events following the ‘Arab Spring’ in fundamen-
tally sectarian ways, which implies and produces a process of depoliticisation of the
popular struggle initiated in 2011. It includes references to non-Sunni groups as heretic
majus (Zoroastrians, polytheists), munafiq (hypocrites), zindig (atheists),38 who do not
belong to the original Islamic community (the Salaf). This evolution in the framing of
the civil war also marks a stark difference between the civil wars outside the Arab
world, such as the French, Greek, Russian and Spanish civil wars, interpreted as wars
between citizens based on different ideologies and visions of the future, and civil wars
in the Middle East, which are interpreted as wars between kinsfolk, that conflagrate
the question of ‘blood,’ ‘culture,’ or ‘nations’ and myths. In other words, civil wars as
conflicts over different visions of the past, turning them into a struggle over who
belongs to a time of origins (the mythology of the fitnah) or to a space of belonging
(the house, nation, the mythology of the ahl). To the accusation of fitnah follows that
of polytheist practices (shirk), which is an accusation of venerating false mythologies,
of speaking ‘untruth.’ For instance, when in control of new territories, the Islamic
State has targeted shrines and devotional sites often belonging to Sufi congregations
36 As opposed to the modern term, which is jang-e dakheli, ‘domestic war.’
37 On the other hand, Iranian authorities have adopted the category of fetneh to refer to protesters
manifesting against the political order, as opposed to protesters asking for reforms.
38 Also in reference to Iranians as the word means ‘very stingy’, an ancient accusation the Arabs in the
Peninsula made against Persians.
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and Shi’i groups. This clearing of other mythologies is material, but it pursues also a
semantic objective as it seeks to extirpate the cultural practices of healing and benedic-
tion that exist around these sites. It is also a combat against the Other’s capacity at
magical thinking through the power of mythologies.
The shift from a struggle over how to govern a nation to who belongs to it empties the
political value of a conflict often born out of a revolution or revolt and activates the
mythological machine. The attempt at overthrowing the state is an attempt at imaging a
new order, alternative forms of political and social organization. The failure to achieve
change, either because the existing order remains in place (i.e., Syria, Iraq) or because the
new ruling cadre does not hold the force to exercise power and dispose a new order
(Libya, Yemen), brings about a situation of civil war, whereby regional and international
powers project their respective mythologies (together with military hardware) upon con-
flicting parties. When civil war fails to produce a new political order because the contend-
ing forces lack the means to establish a new one, even through negotiations, the objective
becomes that of maximizing disorder.39 From a confrontation, even with armed means,
over the nature of the political order, the question transits to the confrontation over control
of territory, the foundation of new mythological communities, and the reification of
belonging, all of which requires the targeted pumping of violence against the Other.40 The
subliminal question at this stage is over who belongs to the house/nation; and not over
how the house should be run. This brings about ‘the depoliticization of citizenship’ – the
lost right of governing the city-space – in favor of the ‘mobilization of the unpolitical’ –
the enfranchisement of values related to ‘blood,’ ‘family,’ ‘creed,’ and foundational myths.
If we conceive civil wars through this prism, it is common to find the use of such terms
as ‘alien,’ ‘satanic,’ ‘apostates’ and ‘traitors.’ Cynicism toward political engagement and
organized collective action drives the interpretation of world affairs, with fear becoming a
central sentiment. It leads to appeals for a strong man to lead the community, the man of
order who opposes the paradigm of the partisan and the revolutionary, whose power lies
in his communal bonds with powerless categories. Fear and mythologies are genealogic-
ally tied, as all mythologies, as Furio Jesi reminds us, are about death and the nationalists’
religio mortis (religion of death).41 The emphasis on purifying the community, extracting
the alien elements from it, and embracing death – both meted and martyred – coopts
mythologies that while deploying ancient referents, formulate also a love for death, some-
how similar to the formulations characterizing ISIS in contemporary times. In this context,
mythologies are the prelude to the mobilization of the unpolitical: The cultural, psycho-
logical and even physical (gendered) elements ousting ideological civics, the family which
in turn props up the nation.
Mythological Practice
As hitherto discussed, the mythological machine feeds the civil war parties through
processes of ‘othering’ vs. ‘belonging,’ and ‘insider’ vs. ‘outsider.’ The process of
39 Agamben, Stasis, p. 11.
40 This transformation of the political culture is an essential element of the ‘new’ nationalism in the post-
Arab revolt era. We will be discussing the rise of the ‘culture of the right’ in a forthcoming book:
Brownlee B. J. & M. Ghiabi States without People (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
forthcoming).
41 Furio Jesi (1979) Cultura di destra [Culture of the right] (Milano: Garzanti), pp. 31–42.
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‘othering’ in the work of the mythological machine is given by the paradigm of the
‘blood accusation’ (known also as blood libel). The practice dates back to the accus-
ation that the Jews used Christian blood in the preparation of their Passover food and
drinks. It is a paradigmatic case of the mythological machine. For example, in 1144,
the Christian community of Norwich, England accused the Jews of having murdered a
young boy, William of Norwich, and to have performed a ritual sacrifice using his
blood during Passover. The myth propagated across the island and Europe. It reap-
peared in the trial of the Jews in 1840 Damascus, where Tommaso da Calangiano and
Ebrahim Amarah, a Christian missionary of the Cappucino order and his servant, were
alleged to have disappeared after visiting the Jewish quarter in Damascus.42 This
‘event’ becomes a trope in the anti-Semitic ideology of later decades, including in
charges that the Jewish community fomented the anti-Christian purges of 1860
Damascus.43 What matters in this example is the way the mythological machine produ-
ces an image of the ‘Other’ as not simply different, but opposite to the one of the
accuser (e.g., Jesus’s sacrificial blood in the Eucharist versus Christian blood in Jews’
Passover rituals).44 It is the ‘Other’ as the unresolvable alien that is the object of the
mythological machine.45
In the Great Civil War, the equivalent of the blood accusation is takfir. The word
means ‘accusing someone of apostasy [kufr].’ The accusation is used by Islamist
groups in the fight against those Muslims who do not align with the former’s funda-
mentalist, often militant vision of their creed. More often, radical jihadi groups, espe-
cially the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, have addressed Shi’is and heterodox Muslim
groups – and Iranians overall – with the accusation of takfir, apostasy, claiming that
they are not true believers, attributing to them a set of mythological crimes akin to the
blood libel.46 As in all mythological machines, the enemy is rendered void of human
value and of the civic right to exist, displaced from their place within the political and
ethical order of life, which we could link to Agamben’s enunciation of homo sacer.47
The Other, hence, also is seen as the conspirator molding history, over-powerful,
omnipresent and yet deceitful and miserable.
42 Also cited in David Bidussa’s ‘Introduction’ to Furio Jesi (1993) L'accusa del sangue: mitologie
dell'antisemitismo [The Blood Libel: Mythologies of Anti-semitism] (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri),
pp. vii–xxx.
43 See Leila Fawaz (1994) An occasion for war: Civil conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860
(Berkley: University of California Press).
44 Jesi, L'accusa del sangue, pp. 17–42.
45 Ussama Makdisi, writing about the July 1860 anti-Christian riot in Damascus: ‘Despite the edicts
promulgating nondiscrimination, a Muslim mob rampaged through the city, pillaging churches and
terrorising the city’s Christian inhabitants. Newspapers in London and Paris and missionary societies
condemned what they saw as ‘Mohammedan’ fanaticism…European powers set up a commission of
inquiry to investigate the massacres of 1860. Their humanitarian motives, however, were conditional
and political. No corresponding commission, after all, was formed to investigate the US oppression and
persecution of people of African descent or its extermination of Native Americans, the decades of
French colonial terror in Algeria, or the British suppression of the anticolonial uprising in India in
1857.’ Makdisi (2017b) ‘Cosmopolitan Ottomans and the Myth of the Sectarian Middle East’, AEON,
October 17. Available at https://aeon.co/essays/ottoman-cosmopolitanism-and-the-myth-of-the-sectarian-
middle-east, accessed August 13, 2020.
46 See William McCants (2014) Satan’s Slaves: Why ISIS Wants to Enslave a Religious Minority in Iraq,
Brookings, October 14. Available at at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2014/10/14/satans-
slaves-why-isis-wants-to-enslave-a-religious-minority-in-iraq/.
47 Cf. Agamben (2003) Stato di eccezione: Homo sacer, II, I (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri).
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The mythological machine of takfir – as that of the blood accusation, of eugenics,
of the migrant barbarism – aims at a process of purification, of cleansing of the com-
munity, of the body politic. It is an essential recipe to the foundation of the mytho-
logical nation as the true nation-state, from being a utopia (‘a place that does not
exist’) to being the eu-topia (‘the good place’).48 In the Great Civil War, the cleansing
occurs against the grain of 20th century colonial history. It targets Sunnis in areas of
Shi’i rule; Shi’i and Christian and other heterodox communities such as the Yezidis, in
those territories where the radical jihadists take control. In the case of ISIS – and, gen-
erally, Salafism, which embraces takfir as ideology – we can see the work of the
mythological machine more blatantly. As a social practice, takfir concerns the defin-
ition of who is a Muslim among those who live in the community, i.e., within the
house-nation. This view holds that the enemies within are far more dangerous than the
far enemies, for instance in the West, bolstering the logic of civil war. To ascertain
membership in a community, the Islamic State has adopted a process of investigation
[tabayun], turning on its head the traditional practice of trusting those who profess
Islam as their religion (through the shahadah), unless proven otherwise. Instead, takfiri
mythological thinking instructs that one is a kafir unless the contrary is proved.
Practices that fall under the category of takfir are many and they mostly are identi-
fied with all those Muslim groups that do not follow the strict Wahhabi interpretation
of Islamic law. Its implications are major: it allows the killing and robbing of Muslims
deemed infidel, that is to say, the ‘malignant other.’49 These teachings are enshrined in
the sermons of several Saudi clerics who regularly legitimize violence against Shi’is as
a justified means of combat.50 This logic is the essence of a civil war governed by the
mythological machine, where belonging and affiliation to the community stands above
all other considerations.
In itself, the establishment of the Islamic State was based on re-claiming the founda-
tion of a new purified state, a promised land for all discontented Muslims living either
in the non-Muslim West or in the usurped land of Muslim ‘hypocritical’ governments.
The call for return addressed all the discontented Muslims as members of a new
ancient community envisioned as the mythological community of the prophet. The
establishment of a Caliphate – rather than a republic or an emirate – indicated also the
foundational importance of a new and ancient space of sovreignty. It is the promise
for a Sunni nation that has yet to be and, at the same time, that was in a past which is
not only remote, but it is a past that is also the archetype of all times, i.e., the times of
origins, of myths. This vision is the work of the mythological machine within the
Great Civil War. In the absence of political principles around which to organize the
community, the mythologies become a substitute, in the form of the principles of a
promised land, the return to a golden era and the embracement of timeless moral codes
– as opposed to the time-bound laws of contemporary societies. This process occurs in
localized forms, but also in the form of global developments in the idea of modern
nations/states.
48 That is how the Nazi ideologues intended to build the new state cleansed of others, such as
communists, gypsies, homosexuals and Jews. See Belpoliti & Manera, Furio Jesi, pp. 132–133.
49 One particular group within the Islamic State, known as the Hazmiyyah, espouses this vision; see
Hasan, The Sectarianism, p. 49.
50 Ibid.
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The pledge to establish a purified state, or the pursuit of a promised land for dis-
placed people, has precedents in modern history, specifically the Zionist movement’s
efforts beginning at the end of the nineteenth century to establish a Jewish state in
Palestine. The second wave of Russian Jews fleeing pogroms in Tsarist Russia
included some who responded to the call of the early Zionist movement for alia and
moved to Palestine, a province within the Turkish Ottoman Empire at the beginning of
the twentieth century:Return to the promised land’ or ‘ascent to’ the higher status of
the original state, i.e., Eretz Israel. The movement identified Palestine as the space for
its nation and for the nationalist cause, declaring it as ‘a land without people for peo-
ple without land,’ where Jewish immigrants could settle freely to re-establish the
mythological community of Eretz Israel, the Land of Israel. Historian Ilan Pappe
examined numerous diaries of Russian settlers and identified a recurrent theme in
those pages, namely the description of local people, the Arabs, as ‘aliens.’ One settler
wrote: ‘[p]eople…were more strange to us than the Russian or Polish peasant…We
have nothing in common with the majority of the people living here…They were not
just “aliens,” they were aggressive aliens.’51 Another settler, Yosef Rabinowtich, who
was a zealot fighter opposing the employment of Palestinians in agricultural labour,
defined the local population as ‘the evil [hara’ hazeh].’ Even when comforted by a
pleasant encounter with an indigenous person, he would say: ‘I met a decent farm-
er… [potentially] a ‘Raa Hola [‘malignant evil].’52 The recurrence of ‘evil’ and
‘malignant other’ represent tropes in the work of mythological machines, which, as
said earlier, qualifies the other not only as the enemy but also as the ultimate opposite
to the community of belonging.
The paradoxical way Zionist settlers then, and right-wing Israeli groups today, refer
to the native population as ‘alien’ is the work of the mythological machine of the
promised land which rejects the existence of a distinct indigenous (i.e. Palestinian)
humanity, othering them into an inescapable evil, which motivated past policies and
probable future visions. 53 One example is the far-right Israeli group Lehava, which
among its core objectives is to expel all non-Jews, including Christians, from the land
of Israel. The plan would guarantee the genetic purity of Jews, as instructed by
Orthodox Judaism (e.g., prohibition of inter-faith marriage).54 The group has accused
Christian Arabs of being ‘blood sucking vampires,’ redeploying the ‘blood libel’
against Palestinians living in Israel.55 This trope is not a marginal expression within
the political scene; instead, it is part of a broader movement embracing religious
nationalist mythologies around purity. For instance, Rafi Peretz, a former Minister of
51 Ilan Pappe (2012) Shtetl Colonialism: First and Last Impressions of Indigeneity by Colonised
Colonisers, Settler Colonial Studies 2(1), pp. 39–58.
52 Ibid, p. 53.
53 A rise of neo-settler colonialism and right wing nativism has emerged in the global South, for example
in Bolivia after the coup against Evo Morales, in Brazil with the election of Jair Bolsonaro, in India
with Narendra Modi.
54 See, for instance, Y. Hakak, (2016) ‘Undesirable relationships’ between Jewish Women and Arab Men:
Representation and discourse in contemporary Israel, Ethnic and Racial Studies 39(6), pp. 976–993.
55 Haaretz (2018) Jewish extremists’ leader: “Christians are blood-sucking vampires who should be expelled
from Israel,” April 10. Available at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-jewish-extremist-group-
wants-to-ban-christmas-in-israel-1.5380284?fbclid=IwAR1Px5PEfmZILXu36wsmCWL1JlPytO0-
XGuBbUGImCUK7Hk38T_ttbl3C7M, accessed August 20, 2020; And Yardena Schwartz (2018)
Israel’s Alt-Right Movement Is Now Mainstream, Newsweek, July 3. Available at https://www.newsweek.
com/2018/03/16/israel-alt-right-mainstream-lawmakers-stop-it-832386.html, accessed August 25, 2020.
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Education, declared that assimilation of American Jews is a ‘second Holocaust,’ in
other words, it equates to the disappearance of the Jewish race.56 Along with this
thinking, mythological ‘scientific’ practice has gained legitimacy. Racial thinking and
genetic purity have returned to the foreground. In 2020, Israel’s High Court declared
the use of the DNA test as proof of a person’s Jewishness to be legitimate and, there-
fore, their eligibility to request Aliyah, according to the Law of Return in 1950.57
The othering of the enemy works through the mythological machine of the rightful
nation, which demands return to a promised land now purified from the malignant
other, the Palestinian. Within the logic of the civil war, which dominates Israel’s polit-
ics toward the Palestinians and, prior to that, with the Zionist movement’s conquest,
there is no place for political and civic life of the other as Other. As Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu declared during the 2015 unrest, ‘Whoever wants to be Israeli
must be Israeli all the way… I will not accept two states within Israel.’58 His son,
Yair, speaking to a Christian Evangelical audience in Alabama, explained what this
vision entails, ‘Most of the Arabs who live today in the land of Israel and who call
themselves “Palestinians,” only came to the land about 100 years ago from neighboring
countries.’ To support his claim, he added that ‘one of the most common last names in
the Palestinian Authority is al-masri [Egyptian]. Another is al-halabi [from Halab,
Aleppo] or al-hijazi [from the Hijaz in the Arabian Peninsula]. You see, not only the
Jews were the first in the land of Israel in ancient times, they were the first in modern
times too.’59
States without People?
If the notion of nation-states was never a successful and complete process in the
Middle East (much as elsewhere), the outbreak of civil wars and the displacement of
communities between and across borders is questioning the very nature of states, sov-
ereignty and citizenship. So the underlining question is who lives in these states? One
of the mythological machine’s key counter-effects is the manifestation of multidimen-
sional displacement. The first occurs under the violence driven by civil war which
causes the physical and geographical dislocation of people; the second is the displace-
ment experienced by those living through protracted civil wars and who find them-
selves in a condition where ideas about their civic-politics, their polis, is unsettled and
unsettling. These two types of displacement are not disjointed; their relationship is cir-
cular because physical displacement enhances the ideational dislocation, which in turn
sharpens the territorialisation of mythological claims around who belongs to the house-
nation (Figure 2).
56 The Independent (2019) Fury after Israeli Minister Likens Intermarriage among Diaspora Jews to a
“second Holocaust”, July 10. Available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-
minister-intermarriage-diaspora-jews-holocaust-rafi-peretz-a8998421.html, accessed August 4, 2020.
57 Haaretz (2020) Israeli High Court Allows DNA Testing to Prove Judaism, January 24). Available at:
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-high-court-allows-dna-testing-to-prove-judaism-1.
8439615, accessed July 4, 2020.
58 Haaretz (2016) Netanyahu: “I won’t accept lawless state within Israel”, January 2. Available at https://
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-netanyahu-i-won-t-accept-lawless-state-within-israel-1.5384968,
accessed July 30, 2020.
59 59 Tal Shalev (2019) Tweet, July 5. Available at https://twitter.com/talshalev1/status/1147063152418414592,
accessed August 24, 2020.
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It is this second type of displacement upon which the mythological machine has
greater influence. One no longer can imagine the nation; neither can one conceive of
communitas in those terms agreed prior the revolt, because the rite of passage that dis-
tinguishes those within the community from those outside it was abolished with the
outbreak of the civil war.60 Bonds of social relations become part of new mythological
communities. The failure of the revolt to institute a political community organized
around civic values – as opposed to sectarian belonging – reifies the rite of passage
into civil war. The boundaries of civic recognition – the social glue of communitas –
disappear. However, this does not make way for the logic of the partisan, which rules
in political revolutionary struggles, but rather makes space for the logic of blood, of
the householder, of the father, of those who share common mythologies. The condition
of life in displacement is therefore that of liminal life, a life harbored along a passage
from the condition of the past order (the object against which the revolt or civil war
occurred in the first place) and the completely new order, the coming community (the
desire for political renewal).61 In this liminal space, the mythological machine governs
the politics of displacement, in ideational as well material effects.
The 2003 Iraq War was a watershed moment, which set the pattern for the outbreak
of multiple civil wars or, as we call it, the Great Civil War. In the period between
2006-2008, sectarian violence forced five percent of Iraq’s total population to leave
their homes and settle elsewhere inside Iraq, while an additional 2 million fled the
country entirely.62 With the consolidation of the Islamic State in 2014 and the erasure
of international borders between Iraq and Syria, the ethnic and sectarian landscapes of
towns, cities and regions have changed indefinitely. Beyond Iraq, the ethnic and reli-
gious heterogeneity of the region was reconfigured by the design of new human
Figure 2. Revolt-civil war-displacement.
60 For a compelling analysis of the liminal moments of revolutions, see Walter Armbrust (2019) Martyrs
and Tricksters: An Ethnography of the Egyptian Revolution (Oxford: Princeton University Press).
61 Cf. Roberto Esposito (1998) Communitas: origine e destino della comunita [Communitas: The Origin
and destiny of community] (Torino: Einaudi).
62 International Organisation of Migration, Iraq (2010). Available at https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/
shared/shared/mainsite/activities/countries/docs/Iraq/IOM_Iraq_Review_of_Displacement_and_Return_in_Iraq_
August_2010.pdf, accessed August 23, 2020.
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geographies and political imaginations driven by the logics of the mythological
machine. Ongoing identity-based population displacements are not only reconstituting
Iraqi, Libyan, Syrian and Yemeni societies but also reshaping those countries that are
absorbing them, like Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Turkey (and Iran if we consider
the Afghan refugee and migrant population; and also Iraqi Arabs and Kurds). For
instance, the prolonged displacement of Syrian refugees beyond national borders not
only is shifting the ethnic balance within Syria but also triggering national anxieties in
countries like Jordan and Lebanon, where the presence of refugees is seen as trans-
forming current demographics and overthrowing existing social orders (i.e., Syrian
workers competing in the low-wage economy while threatening potential future elect-
oral divides, in the event of integration through marriage or naturalization).
What we conceptualized earlier as the workings of the mythological machine
unwrapped a sequence of events that forced many communities to flee from their
homes and neighborhoods and to seek refuge in areas where their community of
belonging was a sectarian issue, in an imagined homogenous unity, or in a diasporic
condition. A profound state-society transformation ensued. The mass movement of
people across territories has had a structural effect. Those displaced within the borders
of the nation-state redefine and reclaim its space through the foundation of new
mythological communities, either coexisting with armed rebellions, or in the liminal
space of survival as in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Those displaced across inter-
national frontiers maintain a virtual link with their community, but effectively they
belong to new liminal ones often patronized by hosting governments (Jordan,
Lebanon, Turkey) or humanitarian organisations. Or in a gray zone of precarious infor-
mality. This activates the mythological machine, which then works toward dismantling
the existing idea of nation-states drawn up by the victorious powers at the end of the
First World War, itself the product of mythological geopolitics informed by
Orientalist knowledge.
The idea of a nation-state built on societal diversity now is being replaced progres-
sively with the notion of a sectarian or ethnic enclave that celebrates uniformity and
homogeneity (hence readability) along the ideological lines traced by the mythological
machine. This implies a redrafting of a new political identity map that exists simultan-
eously with the old cartography of colonial invention made of international state bor-
ders that remain hardly permeable to redrafting.
Hence, the Great Civil War has produced an epochal deterritorialization. The case
of Syria speaks clearly: A country of twenty million people in 2009, 5 million  25
percent –fled the country, while an additional 6.3 million people are internally dis-
placed, living in temporary dwellings in safer areas near Syria’s borders. According to
estimates, 500,000 people have died since 2011.63 Beyond this toll on human lives and
physical economic infrastructure, the Syrian government and subnational military
groups have used identity-based population displacements as a strategy of war. Despite
the success of the regime in reconquering most Syrian territories, the state has disinte-
grated into multiple ethnic-religious enclaves, where Shias and Christians live in con-
tiguity. For all those displaced beyond national borders, the likelihood to return
eventually is linked to the regime staying in power and who controls their homes in
towns of origin (similarly in Iraq, Libya and Yemen). The government also is
63 UNHCR (2018) Syria Emergency. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html,
accessed August 25, 2020.
18 B. J. Brownlee and M. Ghiabi
orchestrating a demographic shift by taking actions to tip the balance of power
between the country's different ethnic groups in Assad's favor by blocking the return
of Sunni refugees to areas of strategic importance. One important measure that threat-
ens any Syrian who is not explicitly pro-Assad is property law (Law No. 10), which is
meant to dispossess the majority of those who fled and/or are associated with anti-
regime groups.64 For many IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and those who remain
refugees outside of Syria — mostly Sunnis — the requirement of establishing proof of
ownership miles away from home is essentially infeasible. Even more unlikely is the
prospect of receiving notification that their properties happen to fall under the govern-
ment designation of a ‘reconstruction’ zone. The least realist expectation is the option
of registration within large parts of Syria given that more than half of the total private
properties within Syria either are unregistered or lacking documents of ownership,
which have been destroyed or lost because of the war. The realities of property owner-
ship in the post-war climate demonstrate the potential for the law to displace perman-
ently those who already have been forced to flee the country once.
Where Are the People?
The Great Civil War has created states without people. These states lack the funda-
mental demos on which to re-enact political life and social organization. Ademia, the
absence of demos, is ultimately the condition cropping out of a civil war fueled by
the mythological machine amidst multidimensional displacement.65 The category of
‘the people’ becomes an empty box used in bolstering state prerogatives. It is recog-
nized only inasmuch as it contributes to the making of a state and its existential plans.
The mythological machine has coded and recoded the meaning of people through the
gateway of idealized, mythological communities, claiming their nation-states, not
reclaiming citizenship. Citizenship itself becomes contested not as a bond between
people living in a land and therefore as an organizational solution to life; instead, it
becomes a non-historical bond legitimizing the mythological machine of blood and
nation, and each group’s role in the Great Civil War.
In these historical and symbolic conditions, states become empty boxes: the category
and existence of ‘people’ is displaced along physical and ideational spaces. It is con-
fined to a liminal condition, which compels people to search for and imagine a new
home or a promised land, which becomes a mythological projection of a timeless
memory. However, a home (oikos) differs from a polis: the latter is a community
based on the civic and the social; the former instead needs to be homogenous, consti-
tuted by unpolitical elements, i.e. blood, family, religion, mythologies. A state without
people is a state where there is no space and no ethical ground for the category of
‘people’ conceived in its unobstructed, open-ended non-definition. Governed by
mythological thinking, mythological speak and mythological practice, the threshold
between blood and politics, the house and the city, oikos and polis, is the new site of
64 See Human Rights Watch (2018) Syria’s New Property Law. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/
2018/05/29/qa-syrias-new-property-law, accessed August 25, 2020.
65 See Agamben, Stasis, p. 59. Mabon too uses ademia, though from a different theoretical angle; see S.
Mabon (2017) Sovereignty, Bare Life and the Arab Uprisings, Third World Quarterly 38(8),
pp. 1782–1799.
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civil war over who belongs to the nation and who is an enemy to it. Within the
scheme of this paradigm, the mythological machine reigns supreme.
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